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Abstract
We report findings from a survey of United States foreign exchange traders. Our
results indicate that: (i) in recent years electronically-brokered transactions have
risen substantially, mostly at the expense of  traditional brokers; (ii) the market
norm is an important determinant of interbank bid-ask spread and the most
widely-cited reason for deviating from the conventional bid-ask spread is a
thin/hectic market; (iii) half or more of market respondents believe that large
players dominate in the dollar-pound and dollar-Swiss franc markets; (iv)
technical trading best characterizes about 30% of traders, with this proportion
rising from five years ago; (v) news about macroeconomic variables is rapidly
incorporated into exchange rates; (vi) the importance of individual
macroeconomic variables shifts over time, although interest rates always
appear to be important; (vii) economic fundamentals are perceived to be more
important at longer horizons, while short-run deviations from the fundamentals
are attributed to excess speculation and institutional customer/hedge fund
manipulation; (viii) speculation is generally viewed positively, as enhancing
market efficiency and liquidity, even though it exacerbates volatility; (ix) central
bank intervention does not appear to have substantial effect, although there is
general agreement that it increases volatility, and finally; (x) traders do not view
purchasing power parity as a useful concept, even though a significant
proportion (40%) believe that it affects exchange rates at horizons of over six
months.
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Conventional wisdom holds that a wide gulf separates the concepts forwarded by academic
economists, and the day-by-day concerns of practitioners. Nowhere is this apparent gap more pronounced
than in the area of international finance. Trade deficits do not matter in the standard monetary model of
exchange rates, yet casual empiricism suggests that currency traders do pay attention to trade balance
announcements. Similar contrasts can be drawn for purchasing power parity and the efficient market
hypothesis. Perhaps because of this gap, the microstructure approach to exchange rates has garnered an
increasingly large number of adherents over recent years. However, data sets that enable formal testing of
microstructure-based hypotheses are only now becoming available. It seems, therefore, a profitable
enterprise to examine evidence available from alternative sources. 
In this spirit, this paper uses information drawn from a survey of U.S.-based foreign exchange
traders designed to elicit information about several aspects of exchange rate dynamics not observable in
typical data sets. In contrast to the conventional research methodology adopted in economics --
theoretical modeling, estimation, and testing -- our survey attempts to ascertain directly how market
participants behave, document their experiences, and solicit their views on the workings of the foreign
currency market.
Two issues will likely arise in the reader’s mind. The first is the economists' long held skepticism
of survey methods, which is derived from the aphorism of “watch what I do, not what I say.” There is a
concern that those individuals surveyed will respond strategically, distorting their answer to gain some
advantage. However, in the current context, there seems little incentive of strategic distortion as the
responses to our survey questions are unlikely to convey competitive advantage to the concerned agents.
Moreover, as argued by Blinder (1991), Shiller et al. (1991), among others, the results from a properly
designed survey can provide valuable facts that are not found in standard models and not available to
econometricians. 
Furthermore, the use of survey data has some well-known advantages. Rather than using the
representative agent paradigm, one can document the extent to which agents are heterogeneous in their
beliefs and behavior. This allows a more fully fleshed-out interpretation of observed exchange rate
dynamics. In view of empirical inadequacies exhibited by extant exchange rate models, the findings
uncovered by a well-constructed survey may provide some useful insights on the market structure and
practitioners' behavior. 
Admittedly, the use of survey data imposes certain limitations upon the researcher. In certain
instances, it is difficult to quantify the association between variables, and to construct easily interpretable
hypothesis tests. Hence, we cannot overstress the point that we view survey data as a complement, rather
than a substitute, for standard empirical analysis.
The second issue pertains to the relevance of individual trader beliefs for those aspects of
economic behavior of interest to economists. One is tempted to assert that the activities at the individual
level are but a mere sideshow compared to the underlying movements in the macroeconomic
fundamentals. This perspective has held sway because, in part, economists have not been able to observe1 To our knowledge, this study is the first to document the trading practices and views in the US
foreign exchange market. Other related studies examine London (Taylor and Allen, 1992), Germany
(Menkhoff,1998) and East Asia (Cheung and Wong,2000).
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what traders react to. In recent work, Evans and Lyons (1999) have used previously unavailable market
(as opposed to individual trader) data on quotes and transactions to link up the activities of traders and
asset prices over several months. They find a strong relationship between customer order flow, and the
DM/US$ exchange rate, even after taking into account interest differentials. Cai et al. (1999) detect a
link between the Yen/US$ rate and customer order flow, even after taking into account macroeconomic
announcements, during 1998. These two studies, then, document an explicit tie between the
microstructure of the forex market and  macroeconomic variables. As the availability of such finely-
detailed data increases, it is likely that such links will become better established.
Our study focuses on several interesting issues in exchange rate economics, in both the
microstructural and macroeconomic areas. One set of survey questions examines the bid-ask spread of
interbank quotes, which has received considerable attention recently. As it is difficult to gather
marketwide data (e.g., trading volume) on foreign exchange trading, the survey method offers an
alternative means to study bid-ask spreads in the interbank market. We also examine other microstructure
issues, including the channels by which interbank foreign exchange transactions take place, the
composition of currency trading, the existence of dominant players in certain currency markets, the
sources of competitive advantage for large players, and the predictability of exchange rates. 
Using the questions on the macroeconomics of exchange rates, we gather information on the
main trading methodology pursued by individual traders, the effects of macroeconomic news, the relative
importance of macroeconomic variables over time, factors (including both fundamental and non-
fundamental variables) affecting exchanges rates at different horizons, the effects of speculation and
central bank intervention, and the market perceptions of the well known notion of purchasing power
parity.
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The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the survey methodology and overviews
the data set. In section 3, we discuss the survey responses in the context of several major issues in the
exchange rate microstructure literature. Section 4 reports the survey results related to various
macroeconomic issues. In section 5, we consider the possible interactions between responses to different
questions in the survey.  Specifically, we formally test whether traders’ responses to one question depend
on their responses to another question.. We offer some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2.  Survey Methodology and Sample Overview
The data used in this study were obtained from a mail survey of the foreign exchange traders
located in the United States. As of April 1998, the United States foreign exchange market was the second
largest after the London market, and constituted about one-fifth of the daily turnover of US$1971.02 Figures are for traditional foreign exchange market activity, including spot, outright forward
and foreign exchange swaps.
3 A copy of the questionnaire is reproduced as Appendix A.
4 8% is bracketed by the “typical” rates of 5% and 10% cited by Alreck and Settle (1995).
5 Typically, these limits can be exceeded on authority of the chief dealer, although the precise
rules vary from organization to organization.
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billion (Bank for International Settlements, 1998).
2 The survey was conducted between October 1996 and
November 1997. The mailing list was compiled from the 1996 and 1997 editions of the Dealers’
Directory published by the Hambros Bank. In preparing the questionnaire, we solicited and incorporated
advice and suggestions from several experienced practitioners.
3 A total of 1796 surveys were mailed, 44
of which proved undeliverable. The number of completed questionnaires returned was 142. The response
rate was approximately 8.1%.This rate is typical for mail surveys.
4 As discussed above, there is no
apparent reason for a specific group of traders to choose to respond or not to respond to our survey. Thus,
we are confident the sample is not likely to be biased one way or the other.
Information about the respondents and their organizations is summarized in Table 1. As indicated
in  Figure 1.a, most respondents are experienced practitioners. Over 80% of  them have the title
"chief/senior dealer"  or "treasurer/manager." We therefore believe that the views recorded in the survey
are representative of participants with extensive experience in the foreign exchange market. In fact, the
proportion of experienced traders in our sample is comparable to the one in the mailing list. Thus, our
sample is reasonably representative of the traders in the U.S. market.
The intraday position limit is the maximum open position a dealer is authorized to assume during
the day.  Since, in most cases, dealers  square their positions at the end of a trading day, the intraday
position  limit can be used as a proxy for a dealer's trading capacity. To buttress this point, note that
Lyons (1998) documents the half-life of a dealer’s position is only 10 minutes. Most respondents in
Table 1.b have a daytime position limit below US$25 million.
5 Only a few respondents stated their
position limits in terms of the value at risk.
Figure 1.c indicates that, as expected, a plurality of  the respondents are associated with banks
headquartered in the United States. Europe comes a close second. Japan comes far behind as the next
most likely headquarters location, with only 8%.
Data on average daily turnover, which measures the activity and market share of a trading bank,
are reported in Figure 1.d. The response pattern indicates a bimodal distribution, with 31% reporting a
daily turnover of US$100-499 million, and 28% a figure of between US$1000-5000 million.
3.  Microstructure-Related Empirical Results
3.1  Trading Channels and Business Composition
It is of interest to view the evolution of the forex market. We document some salient features in
Table 1. In Panel 1.a, we investigate the proportion of transactions via either interbank trades, traditional6 Goodhart, Ito and Payne (1996) document the characteristics of the activities of the Reuters
D2000-2 electronic brokering system.
7 A more detailed discussion is presented in New York Foreign Exchange Committee (1997).
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brokers, and electronic brokers.
6  The mean responses together with the modal responses and the standard
error are presented. Both the mean and modal responses indicate that five years prior to the survey,
transactions were apportioned equally between interbank and traditional broker trades. Transactions via
electronic brokers constituted only about 2% (mean responses) of total trades. In the more recent period,
the average response on interbank transactions had fallen to roughly one-third of total transactions; at the
same time, traditional brokers lost considerable ground to electronic brokers, such that the latter
constituted 46% of total trades, and the former only 17%. The standard error measure indicates that there
is a wide variation in the way these traders channel their trades. For example, the proportion of trades
channeled through the interbank market range from 0 to 100%.
The upsurge in electronic brokers documented in the survey is in accord with the 1998 Federal
Reserve Bank of New York survey which indicated that almost 1/3 of all April 1998 spot transactions
were conducted through order-matching systems (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1998: 6).
7 Perhaps
more telling are the minimum and maximum estimates of trade conducted through each mode. Five years
ago, the maximum response for trade taking place through traditional brokers was 100%; the more recent
maximum proportion is 80%. The maximum proportion taking place through electronic brokers was 30%
in the earlier period; more recently, it is 95! Overall, it appears that electronic broker transactions have
substituted out mostly, but not exclusively, for traditional broker trades. 
While the method of the transactions has changed substantially, the nature of the business has
remained remarkably constant. Panel 1.b reports that, on average, 62% of transactions were interbank
business related, virtually the same proportion as five years earlier, while 35% were customer related. In
fact, we found that there is no significant difference between the distributions of interbank and customers
transactions during the five years period.
3.2  The Interbank Bid-Ask Spread
Responses to survey questions regarding the magnitude of interbank bid-ask spreads are
presented in Figure 2. The questions involve (a) the magnitude of the average bid-ask spread, (b) the
frequency distribution of deviations from convention, (c) the frequency of adhering to the convention, (d)
reasons for adherence to the convention, and (e) reasons for deviation from the convention. Conventional
spreads in the interbank market, according to respondents, are displayed in Figure 2.a. While a wider
spread is acceptable in a hectic market, the ability to consistently offer quotes with these conventional
spreads in a hectic market is regarded as an essential characteristic of a market leader. The conventional
spreads for four major trading currencies reported in Figure 2.a are largely in accordance with those
described by traders. These numbers also confirm the observation that actual interbank spreads are8 The mean and median spreads are not substantially different from the modal values reported in
Figure 2.a. The means are 5.09, 3.49, 3.37 and 4.70, as compared against the modal and median values of
5, 3, 3 and 5.
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narrower than indicative quotes on the Reuters screen (Bessembinder, 1994; Lyons, 1995).
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In accordance with the reported clustering of bid-ask spreads at a few distinct values (Bollerslev
and Melvin, 1994; Lyons, 1995), our survey indicates that only a small proportion of interbank bid-ask
spreads differ from the conventional one (Figure 2.b).  Most of the non-conventional spreads are
narrower and only a few are wider: 26% of the respondents say that over 20% of their quotes have
spreads narrower than the conventional one, while 75% indicate that less than 10% of their interbank
quotes have a spread wider than the conventional one. One respondent provided some possible
explanations for this asymmetry. “Lower volatility enables the professional trader to quote tighter prices,
due to less risk. Secondly, professional dealers pride themselves on the risk they are able to 'endure' via
tighter pricing.”
Figures 2.c to 2.e shed some insights on the rationale of deviating from the conventional
interbank spread. 69% of the respondents suggest the market norm, rather than the potential cost of
making a quote, determines their interbank bid-ask spreads in most circumstances (Figure 2.c).
By far, the most frequently cited reason for adopting the conventional spread is to "maintain an
equitable and reciprocal trading relationship" (Figure 2.d). In the interbank market, foreign exchange
trading is conducted according to several tacit agreements that reduce transaction costs and create a
perception of fair trading. For example, traders are expected to respond to a request for quotes within a
reasonable time span. A two-way price with a conventional spread is another practice traders expect from
each other. The responses confirm that practitioners tend to observe the tacit agreement to maintain an
equitable trading environment.
Traders postulate that frequent violations of tacit agreements result in loss of reputation. It is
important for both banks and traders to maintain their reputation so others will choose to trade with them.
Offering quotes with a conventional spread is one of the ways in which a trader can establish his
reputation. Thus, it is not surprising to see "secure a good market image for the firm and the dealer" as
the second most cited reason for conforming to the conventional spread.
Compared with the two preceding reasons, trading profits are a much less significant factor for
setting the spread. Less than 6% of respondents select this choice. This reinforces the presumption that
potential costs play a minor role in determining the spread (Figure 2.c). As one trader said, “The bid/ask
spread is hardly sufficient for a dealer to make money, unless his/her desk has significant business on
both sides of the market, such that they are able to 'capture' the spread by both buying and selling with
different counterparties. Dealers make the majority of their profit on rate movement, not spread.” The
comment highlights a fundamental difference between an organized exchange such the New York Stock
Exchange and the decentralized multiple-dealer foreign exchange market. In the New York Stock6
Exchange, specialists match buyers and sellers for most of the trading hours and the spread represents a
considerable portion of their profits. On the other hand, in the interbank foreign exchange market, dealers
have to accommodate one-way  transactions based on (their) quotes. Given the quick movement in
exchange rates and the decentralized nature of the market, it is not common for dealers to maintain the
same quote to exploit the profit from the bid-ask spread. 
As reported in Figure 2.e, the most cited reason for deviating from the conventional spread is a
"thin and hectic market" (31%). This choice and the one of "thin and quiet market" account for more than
40% of the responses. Liquidity effects, especially in the presence of uncertainty as exemplified by a
hectic market, seem to have significant implications for bid-ask spreads. 
The role of uncertainty is further illustrated by 43% of the responses claiming "increased market
volatility," "before/after a major news release," and "unexpected change in market activity" are the
reasons for deviating from the market convention. These three reasons are related to a potential increase
in the level of market uncertainty. The choices of the volatility factor lend support to the empirical
findings reported  in Bollerslev and Melvin (1994). Thus, our respondents confirm anecdotal evidence,
garnered from conversations, that wider bid-ask spreads tend to occur under such circumstances. They
also match the statistical results obtained by Jorion (1996) indicating a correlation between volatility and
bid-ask spreads.
Only a small percentage of respondents say they widen the spread when they are holding a
position against the market trend or the cost of keeping their positions is increasing. The importance of
these two inventory-cost related factors is played down (2%).
Market traders we interviewed confirm that, given the trading mechanism, it is not unexpected to
observe the weak association between bid-ask spreads and trading positions reported in Figure 2.e.
Traders rely on interbank trading to access information on market sentiments and other market makers'
activities. Market moving news is mainly disseminated through direct interbank dealing before brokered
interbank transactions. Therefore, active traders do not want to reveal information on their own
unfavorable positions by offering a wide spread quote. Compared with the wide swing of intraday
exchange rates, a few points advantage associated with a wide spread has very limited impact on trading
profits. In addition, making wide spread quotes under normal market conditions has the side effect of
damaging a trader's reputation and driving away potential trading opportunities, which can severely
hinder a dealer's ability to read the market and make profitable trade in the future. Thus, most traders do
not widen the spread solely because of adverse positions. On the other hand, some practitioners pointed
out that a good trading position, for example a long dollar position when the dollar is strengthening, gives
a dealer an opportunity to establish or enhance his reputation as a trader by offering a good two-way
price in a hectic market without incurring a loss. 
Our survey results provide some indirect evidence of the asymmetric information effect on
interbank bid-ask spreads. A standard microstructure theory (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) predicts a
trader will quote a wide spread when he believes his counterparty has superior information. However,9 These figures are for spot market trading which constitutes roughly half of total foreign
exchange trading (the other components are forward contracts and swaps).
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only a relatively small percentage of the responses consider dealing with either a small bank or an
informed trading bank as reasons for offering non- conventional spreads. If the two types of banks
represent market participants with, respectively, little and superior market information, then most traders
do not consider informational asymmetry in determining their bid-ask spreads.  This finding
complements the implication of a model recently developed by Perraudin and Vitale (1996). The authors
model the trading process as the means by which traders acquire timely market information from other
market participants and, consequently, show the standard asymmetric costs argument may not apply to
the decentralized foreign exchange market.  
Compared with the factors related to inventory and asymmetric costs, a slightly lower percentage
of responses say "a wide spread quote from a counterparty" is a reason for offering a wide spread  quote. 
Market participants offer two possible interpretations. First, the counterparty's wide spread quote may
signal some information which the trader is not aware of. Second, as a protest and a demand for a fair
trading relationship, traders do retaliate and offer a wide spread quote back to the same counterparty. 
Overall, the traders suggest that the market convention, an element not commonly mentioned in
the literature, is an important determinant of interbank bid-ask spreads. In contrast with the literature on
bid-ask spreads in organized equity exchanges, factors such as profits, inventory and asymmetric
information are not considered prominent reasons for deviating from the conventional interbank spread.
Market uncertainty is perceived to be an obvious reason to deviate from the market convention. Even
though market uncertainty is intrinsically related to inventory effects, informational advantage, and
profitability, traders attribute their adherence to conventional spreads to non-pecuniary factors such as
norm, market image, and personal pride.
3.3 Do Dominant Players Exist?
In the US foreign exchange market, dollar/mark, dollar/yen, dollar/pound, and dollar/Swiss franc
are the four most actively traded exchange rates (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1998). Less than
25% of our respondents believe the dollar/mark and dollar/yen markets are dominated by a few big
players (Figure 3.a). On the other hand, there is a split of opinion over the dollar/pound rate. About 50%
of the respondents say the dollar/pound market is dominated by a few big players. Even more striking, for
the Swiss franc almost 60% indicate that the big players exert dominance. These two results may be
related to the relatively small dollar/pound and dollar/Swiss franc trading volumes in this markets. The
Federal Reserve Bank of New York survey shows that the daily average turnover of dollar/mark spot
dealings in the New York market was US$43.8 billion and that of the dollar/yen was US$30.5 billion in
April 1998. During the same period, however, the total daily average turnover of dollar/pound and
dollar/Swiss franc transactions in this market was only US$10.2 billion and US$7.6 billion, respectively.
9
In line with this view, one trader suggested that low liquidity, rather than few players, was a key factor in10 Although this same trader allowed that the relative paucity of traders in the Australian and
Canadian dollar markets may explain the dominance of a few players.
11 The mean (median ) responses for intraday, medium and long run horizons are 2.26, 3.07 and
2.96 (2, 3 and 3), respectively. The standard deviations of responses are 1.01, 1.08 and 1.35, respectively.
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the dollar/Swiss franc market.
10
Interestingly, the response that large players exist, and do possess advantages, is in disagreement
with remarks in Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1998: 8) that “the foreign exchange market
remained similarly competitive in 1998 compared to 1995.” The New York Fed’s conclusions were based
on a 5-firm market share of 31%, and a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market concentration of 317,
interpeted by the New York Fed survey as a high value. 
With regard to the sources of large players' competitive advantage, respondents say "large
customer base" and "better information" about the market are the two main factors. These two factors
account for 56% of the total responses. Essentially, large players are perceived to have a better customer
and market network, which, in turn, give them better information on order flow and the activity of other
trading banks. The importance of a large customer base underscores recent efforts to use customer orders
to explain the trading mechanism and trading volume (Lyons, 1997). The next two frequently mentioned
sources are "deal in large volumes" and "ability to affect exchange rates." Other factors receive a much
lower response rate (15% and 9%, respectively).  
3.4 The Predictability of Exchange Rates
There is an enormous literature documenting the difficulties of predicting exchange rates using
structural or time series models (Frankel and Rose, 1995). In this section, we ask the foreign exchange
traders themselves how predictable they believe exchange rates are. This is an interesting question
because presumably the traders themselves have a larger information set than the typical econometrician
who has access only to macro data available intermittently, and to selected financial variables such as
interest rates and stock prices at high frequencies.
We asked traders to rate the degree of predictability at three horizons – intraday, medium run (up
to six months) and long run (over six months). In Figure 4, a rating of 1 indicates no predictability, while
a rating of 5 indicates high predictability. Perhaps not surprisingly, at the intraday frequency, exchange
rates are viewed as essentially unpredictable. 62% give ratings of 1 or 2. The modal response is a 2
rating. Only 11% give ratings of 4 or 5. 
As the horizon moves to the medium and long run, the modal response becomes a rating of 3.
Interestingly, the distinction of medium- and long-run does not seem to matter for the traders’ views on
predictability. 30% of traders rate medium-run predictability as a 4 or 5, and 35% view predictability at
the long-run similarly.
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The question why this pattern obtains remains a key puzzle in international finance. As pointed
out by Flood and Rose (1995), among many others, floating exchange rates are far more variable than the12 Menkhoff (1998) examines various hypotheses concerning the differential behavior of
fundamentalists and noise traders, using a survey tailored specifically toward this purpose.
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observable macro determinants such as money stocks, interest and inflation rates. The most persuasive
explanations have been rooted in microstructural explanations, such as Osler (1998). Osler presents a
model wherein random shocks are translated into near random walk behavior of the exchange rate by the
activities of noise traders (De Long, et al., 1990).
Apparently, exchange rates are perceived to be more predictable in the medium and long terms.
However, dealers in general hold an open position for very short periods. In fact, in most cases, dealers
close out their daily positions before leaving offices. Given their views on predictability, why doesn’t a
typical dealer maintain an open position for a long period? Two observations are in order. First, the
change in perceived predictability is not large in magnitude. The modal response increases from 2 for the
intraday horizon to 3 in the medium to long run. Second, respondents do not view predictability and low
variability as synonymous. The traders realistically attach a higher level of risk to a longer-term open
position. Indeed, the position limit (both daytime and overnight) is an mechanism for the banks to control
the exposure to a level the management feels comfortable with (also, see Goodhart, 1988). 
4. Macroeconomic Related Empirical Results
4.1 Chartists and Fundamentalists
Frankel and Froot (1990b) argue that the endogenously changing prevalence of technical trading
(what they termed chartism) might explain the seemingly random nature of exchange rate movements,
especially in relation to the macroeconomic fundamentals that economic theory indicates should be
relevant. Taylor and Allen (1992) report that 90% of London traders surveyed used at least some
technical analysis.  In this survey, we ask for the description that best describes their trading practices.
We believe that responses to this question are more informative about the relative importance of
technical trading in determining exchange rate dynamics.
12 
The results in Figure 5 indicate that technical trading best describes only 30% of trading
behavior. This is only a slightly greater proportion than that ascribed to fundamental analysis (25%). The
rest of the trading is characterized as either customer order driven (22%) or “jobbing” (23%), defined
further below. The prevalence of technical trading appears to have changed over time; five years ago,
only 19% of respondents indicated that technical trading was the best description of their trading
strategy. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that chartists have come to dominate over
fundamentalists. Rather, technical trading seems to have gained at the expense of jobbing, rather than
fundamentalist analysis.
The a priori effect of this shift on exchange rate dynamics is uncertain. “Jobbing” describes a
trading style in which the trader continuously buys and sells in order to make many profits in perhaps
small increments. As such, one could interpret this strategy as one of speculation at the very high13 See for instance Evans (1998) for a persuasive graph of the DM/$ rate and cumulative
customer order  flow imbalance.
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frequency. To the extent that jobbing performs the same type of role as Friedman-type stabilizing
speculation, the Frankel-Froot conjecture on endogenously changing trader proportions would still hold
true, although the buying and selling is undertaken at such a short horizon, it would be somewhat
difficult to interpret adherents of  the jobbing approach as “fundamentalists”. Furthermore, it is not clear
that speculation is always stabilizing. Osler (1998) has forwarded a model wherein random shocks are
propagated by the actions of rational agents acting (in the presence of noise traders) in such a manner as
to make the exchange rate follow a near random walk. Even when all agents are rational, speculation may
induce more, rather than less, volatility when interest rates are taken into account (Carlson and Osler,
1996).
In contrast to the trends discussed above, the other two categories – fundamentals and customer
orders – have each accounted for remarkably stable proportions of responses to this question over the two
time periods. The fundamentals characterization declines negligibly, from 25% of responses to 23%,
while customer orders rises slightly from 22% to 23%. Presumably, traders using primarily
fundamentalist techniques are looking at variables like interest and inflation rates, GDP and money
stocks. The issue of what variables traders pay attention to is discussed below in Section 4.3. The
constancy of the fundamentalists is notable because it contrasts very strongly with the tabulation
undertaken by Frankel and Froot (1990a). They found that according to data reported in Euromoney the
number of foreign exchange forecasting firms, or services (not individual forecasters), that used
fundamentals fell from 19 to 0 from 1978 to1984 (the peak of the dollar), and then rose back up to 7 in
1988.  Our results suggest that dramatic shifts in trading strategies among interbank dealers have not
occurred during the 1990s.
Customer orders are of interest because they constitute another link between the larger
macroeconomic forces in the economy, and the factors that individual traders contend with.
13 One is
tempted to ascribe a relatively minor role to customer order flows because presumably they are primarily
a function of trade-based motivations. Further the absolute value of all annual current accounts is equal
to a day’s forex trading volume. However,  Lyons (1997) has forwarded a  model in which customer
orders act as the exogenous shocks that perturb the foreign exchange market. As risk averse dealers
attempt to manage their inventories, the initial order is magnified several-fold; hence such inventory
models can explain the enormous volume in the foreign exchange market. Lyons (1996) provides
empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
This complex mix of trading strategies suggests that any integrated model will need to map the
theoretical motivations to the particular trading methods in order to successfully explain exchange rate
dynamics.11
4.2 The Effect of News
The idea that “news” -- that is innovations in macroeconomic variables -- causes the great bulk of
movements in exchange rates has a venerable history, going back at least as far as Frenkel (1981).
However, empirical attempts to link exchange rate movements to news effects of specific macroeconomic
variables have been hampered by the difficulty in extracting the unexpected component of the news, as
well as the fact that the studies are often conducted with relatively low frequency data. In particular, it
may be that announcement effects have dissipated by the time the exchange rate data are sampled, even
when the data frequency is daily or even hourly. 
According to our survey results, the exchange rate responds to news with extreme rapidity – on
the order of minutes for most variables. Figure 6 presents the time that market participants indicate is
necessary for full adjustment to economic announcements regarding a number of macroeconomic
variables: unemployment, the trade deficit, inflation, GDP, the interest rate, and the money supply. For
the first five variables, the bulk of the adjustment takes place within one minute. In fact, there is a
striking uniformity in the responses. Consistently, about 1/3 of the respondents indicate that full
adjustment takes place in less than 10 seconds! (Money is an exception – less than 20% respond thus.) In
these cases, even minute by minute data might not catch this news effect. For instance, Tanner (1997)
reports complete adjustment of the DM-$ rate to trade deficit figures in half an hour, but no significant
responses to news about money supply, industrial production or unemployment. His results may be
driven by the fact that the data -- in five minute installments -- are of insufficiently high frequency. In
contrast, using tick-by-tick data, Ederington and Lee (1993) find adjustment of volatility within the first
minute to major announcements, confirming the need for relatively high frequency data to detect
announcement effects. More recently, Anderson and Bollerslev (1998) analyzed a year’s worth of 5-
minute returns and concluded that volatility adjusts to news announcements within 10 to 20 minutes.
Interestingly, in the survey responses money supply announcements appear to be an outlier in
several respects. First, 12% of respondents indicate that it takes more than 30 minutes for the adjustment
to take place. This contrasts starkly with the 3% of respondents who indicate more than 30 minutes for
the other five variables. Second, as mentioned above, the proportion of respondents indicating that
adjustment to money announcements occurs within the initial 10 seconds is markedly less than the
proportion reported for the other variables (except perhaps GDP). It is not clear why the response to the
money supply announcement should differ so much from that of the others, although there is a striking
pattern in the low importance accorded to monetary aggregates, as shown in Figure 7 and discussed
below.
4.3  What Matters and When Does It Matter?
While Figure 6 indicates the rapidity by which adjustment takes place, it does not shed any light
on the relative importance of each of these macroeconomic variables, and the relevant time horizon. In
this section, we first assess the impact of each of these variables on the foreign exchange market now,
and five years ago; then we examine more closely the horizon at which these variables have their effects.14 The unemployment rate as a indicator of future Fed policy seems more plausible, since current
inflation announcements are not viewed as very informative. Interestingly, employment announcements
appear to be very influential in the Anderson and Bollerslev (1998) analysis of the period corresponding
to the early period (5 years prior to the survey) referred to in the survey.
15 See for instance MacDonald and Taylor (1993) and Baxter (1994) among others. On
theoretical grounds, the interest rate shows up as a determinant of the exchange rate in almost any extant
model, ranging from ad hoc models such as the Frenkel (1976) and Dornbusch (1976) variants, to general
equilibrium models of the Lucas (1982) type.
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Figure 7 reports the effects of economic announcements on the foreign exchange market. The
two most important variables, by far, are unemployment and the interest rate, at 33% and 31%
respectively.  The money supply and GDP rank as the least important. As noted in the discussion of
Figure 6, these two variables evinced the slowest rate of adjustment. Perhaps the adjustment is slowest
because these variables are widely considered irrelevant. Furthermore, GDP may also be ranked of lower
importance because of the relative infrequency of GDP announcements, especially as compared to other
indicators of aggregate activity such as unemployment and industrial production, both reported at a
monthly, rather than quarterly, frequency.
Besides the issue of data frequency, some traders have pointed out that there are some
ambiguities in the interpretation of GDP announcements. GDP is the sum of many components, so the
growth rate of aggregate output may not be a sufficient statistic, and in fact may require more analysis in
order to determine the true impact of the economic release. One concrete example of this factor is the
distinction between growth arising from an export surge, versus that arising from inventory
accumulation. The former has a positive implication for future output growth, while the latter has the
converse and hence the two have different implications on exchange rate movements. 
It is of interest to compare the import adduced to each variable as compared to five years ago.
The respondents (see Figure 7) pointed to the trade deficit as the key variable, which makes sense since
at that time (approximately 1991-92), the trade deficit was starting to rise again, after declining to near
zero during the 1990-91 recession. Unemployment, which ranks first in the current survey period, was
then only second. To the extent that unemployment proxies for expected inflation or, more likely, for
anticipated Fed monetary policy, this pattern makes sense as the economy is widely thought to be
currently operating very near potential.
14  The factor that garnered the second most number of responses
is the interest rate; this was also the second ranked item for the current period, suggesting a consistent
role for interest rates in exchange rate determination. We conjecture that the importance accorded
interest rate announcements arises from the fact that such news flows continuously from the markets; in
contrast, the other variables are announced at scheduled intervals. In sum, this prominence should not be
very surprising, given the fact that, of all the macroeconomic variables that find their way into empirical
models of exchange rates, it is the interest rate or interest differential that most often shows statistical and
economic importance.
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These results have a number of implications for conventional empirical approaches to exchange
rate determination. First, the fact that the rankings of variables changes over time may provide an
explanation for why quasi-structural models of the exchange rate appear to evidence parameter instability
(Frankel and Rose, 1995). It might also provide a rationale for the superiority of time-varying parameter
approaches in short-horizon exchange rate forecasting. Wolff (1987) estimated a monetary model using a
Kalman filter to update coefficients; he found that he could outperform a random walk in out-of-sample
forecasts. Schinasi and Swamy (1989) used a different time-varying parameter model to obtain similar
results.  
  In Figure 8, we attempt to discern at what horizon fundamentals matter, and what other factors
besides fundamentals may influence exchange rates. Figure 8.a supports the general presumption that at
short horizons such as the intraday, exchange rate movements do not reflect changes in fundamental
values. In the medium run, which we have defined as a horizon of up to six months, 59% of respondents
believe that exchange rate movements do reflect fundamentals. This proportion rises to 88% for the long
run (over six months).
The result mirrors the emerging consensus that the conventional macroeconomic fundamentals
have little effect at short horizons, but do have an impact at longer horizons  (Flood and Taylor, 1996 for
relative PPP; Meredith and Chinn, 1998, for uncovered interest rate parity). For instance, Mark (1995)
documents the out-of-sample performance of a flexible-price monetary model of the exchange rate.
Chinn and Meese (1995) provide similar results for various models, including ones that include a role for
money supplies, incomes, interest and inflation rates, and -- in certain cases -- cumulated trade balances
and the relative price of nontradables to tradables (the latter is a proxy for sectoral productivity
differentials).  
The question naturally arises as to what causes the deviations from fundamental values. We offer
a variety of possible explanations, including excess speculation, major trading bank manipulation,
institutional customer or hedge fund manipulation, and excessive central bank intervention. In Figure 8.b
excess speculation garners the largest positive response, at 74% of respondents. Only 19% disagree with
this conclusion.  Surprisingly, institutional customer/hedge fund manipulation comes a close second, with
68% of respondents ascribing some blame there. There appears to be an even split regarding the role of
major trading banks, with a relatively large proportion (12%) of respondents indicating no opinion.
Central bank intervention -- often characterized as ineffectual -- is viewed as exacerbating deviations of
the exchange rate from their fundamentals by 39% of the respondents.
The role of institutional customer/hedge funds merits some discussion, especially in light of the
recent debate over the East Asian currency crisis. Eichengreen et al. (1998) argue that hedge funds were
not exacerbating factors in the onset of the crisis; moreover, such hedge funds typically control relatively
small amounts of capital. On the other hand, the gyrations of the yen in late 1998 have given renewed
credence to the view that other institutional investors tend to follow the lead of hedge funds. Moreover,
due to their sometimes very high leverage, hedge funds such as Long Term Capital Markets and Tiger16 Frankel and Froot (1987) use mean forecasts from The Economist, American Express Bank
Review, and Money Market Services. Chinn and Frankel (1994) use geometric mean response forecasts
from Currency Forecasters’ Digest, now published under the title Financial Times Currency Forecaster. 
17 See also Lai and Pauly (1992). In contrast, using a shorter sample Taylor and Allen (1990) fail
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Management can at times exert a powerful influence on prices, especially on thinly traded currencies
(Economist, October 10, 1998; Sesit and Pacelle, 1998). 
In order to assess the temporal dimension of these deviations from fundamentals, we ask at what
horizon these factors come into play (Figure 8.c). At the intraday horizon, most respondents indicate
either over-reaction to news, bandwagon effects, or speculative forces as the primary factors in exchange
rate movements (29%, 30% and 26% respectively). Technical trading enters in with a 14% response rate.
In the medium run, economic fundamentals tie with technical trading (32% versus 31%) in gathering the
most responses. However, speculative forces are still accorded surprisingly high importance (24%).
Consistent with the earlier responses, traders believe that there is essentially no over-reaction to news in
the medium run. Turning to the long run, one finds that economic fundamentals are of paramount
importance, while all other factors – bandwagon, over-reaction, speculation, and technical trading – fade
into insignificance.
How do these responses correlate with survey data on exchange rate expectations? Bandwagon
effects can be defined explicitly in the context of the equation,
where s is the nominal exchange rate, and ∆s
e
t,t+k is the expected nominal depreciation between time t and
t+k, using time t information. A carat (“^”) indicates that this is the survey-based measure of
expectations. 
A coefficient of α1 > 1 is consistent with bandwagon effects. Neither Frankel and Froot (1987),
nor Chinn and Frankel’s (1994) update, report any statistically significant evidence of bandwagon
effects.
16 However, the forecast horizons they examine are 3, 6 and 12 months. The bandwagon effects
are likely to manifest themselves at particularly high frequencies. Froot and Ito (1989) use weekly data
from the surveys conducted by Money Market Services (MMS), and detect bandwagon effects at the one
week horizon, and to a lesser extent, at the one month horizon. At all longer horizons, they obtain
coefficient estimates indicating that, overall, there is short term over-reaction relative to long term
expectations.
17 Hence, Froot and Ito (1989) and Ito (1990) conclude that there is an “expectational twist”
in traders’ views.
In sum, traders believe that economic fundamentals play a substantial role in setting exchange
rates over the long haul. Nonetheless over one-half of the respondents select non-fundamental factors
such as speculative forces and technical analysis as the factors determining exchange rates up to the15
medium-run horizon. Further, the relative importance of individual macroeconomic variables on
exchange rate movement is not the same over time. In order to provide an adequate description of
exchange rate movements, structural models, for example, have to address at least the issues of the time-
varying nature of macroeconomic effects and the difficulty in quantifying the non-fundamental elements.
4.4 The Effects of Speculation and Central Bank Intervention
The effect of speculation in foreign exchange markets is a perennial favorite topic among
journalists and policymakers. Evidence of this can be found in for instance the recent IMF report on the
activities of hedge funds in causing the East Asian currency crises of 1997 (Eichengreen, et al., 1998). 
In Figure 9, we report the results from our inquiry regarding the effects of speculation.
Overwhelmingly, traders agree with the proposition that speculation increases volatility (84%). While
this appears to indicate a pernicious role for speculation, interestingly, traders also view speculation as
pushing exchange rates toward their fundamental values. Moreover, speculation is viewed as enhancing
market liquidity by 81%, and improving market efficiency by 74%. Hence, an interesting outcome of this
pattern of responses is that speculation is viewed as an integral aspect of the foreign exchange market,
and that volatility is not inimical to working markets.
The idea that speculation is stabilizing goes back to Friedman’s (1953) conjecture. This view is,
however, inconsistent with the McKinnon (1976) argument that locates excessive exchange rate volatility
in insufficient speculation. The opinions reflected in this survey propound the idea that volatility,
stabilization (in the sense of moving towards fundamentals) and speculation go hand in hand. To the
extent that volatility is measured by higher variance in changes, and stabilization as being closer on
average to the “correct” value, the seeming inconsistency can be resolved. 
The role of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market has generated a large body
of research.  Typically, researchers conclude that foreign exchange intervention has little effect on the
first moment (Obstfeld, 1990), although Edison (1993), Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Kaminsky
and Lewis (1996) have argued for a channel for intervention through the signalling of future monetary
policy. Our survey results (Figure 10) are consistent with the view of little effect, with opinion about
evenly split between intervention pushing currencies away and toward their fundamental value. There is
similarly a split opinion on whether such intervention is “successful” where the criterion of success is
determined by the respondent’s interpretation of the central bank’s goal. There is a slightly more positive
response on the appropriateness of the timing of central bank intervention (60%). Finally, 61% of
respondents view central bank intervention as exacerbating volatility (Figure 10.a). One might view these
last two responses as mutually inconsistent; however, as in the question regarding the effects of
speculation, increases in volatility may go hand in hand with market efficiency, in the view of market
participants. These results are not inconsistent with those obtained by Edison (1998) in her case studies
of central bank intervention. She finds that US intervention in recent years (which would be most
prominent in the memory of these traders) has been infrequent, and sizable by historic standards;
moreover, they have effected changes, albeit short-lived, in the trend of exchange rates. This experience18 The recent intervention on the behalf of the Japanese yen in June 1998 might also be construed
as successful, even though the yen continued to stay at a relatively weak level for the subsequent month.
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may explain why the US traders have a relatively positive view of central bank intervention.
18 
4.5 Purchasing Power Parity 
In our last set of questions, we attempt to determine what the traders’ views are on a popular
model of exchange rates, namely purchasing power parity (PPP). First we wish to assess the definition
which traders use to interpret purchasing power parity. In Figure 11.a, response rates are displayed for
four definitions. By a large majority -- 63% -- respond that PPP is “merely academic jargon.” 16%
interpreted PPP as meaning that price levels are the same in the same currency unit. Only 11% responded
that PPP gave fair exchange rates, about the same proportion of respondents that gave “other”
explanations. One representative statement is that PPP “...is rarely reached or maintained.” Another
signals a befuddlement shared by the economics profession, indicating that “it should work but doesn't,
maybe the basket is wrong, or it excludes capital flows and real interest rates”.
The disdain the traders held for PPP as a useful business concept is reflected in the numbers in
Figure11.b. A dollar overvaluation indicated by PPP would induce no action on 81% of traders. Only
13% would sell dollars.  On the other hand, the proportion of traders saying PPP is a condition relevant
to exchange rate prediction increases as the horizon goes from the intraday to the long run, according to
the results in Figure 11.c. At the intraday horizon, PPP has no role according to 93% of respondents. At
horizons of up to six months, a resounding 81% of respondents still view PPP as irrelevant; 9% disagree.
Only at the long horizon of over six months – what these traders would likely characterize as “only
academic” – does any substantial proportion of traders view PPP as having any influence: 40%, which is
still less than one half of the respondents.
The very low importance accorded deviations from PPP provides one possible explanation for
why real exchange rates appear to revert very slowly to PPP. Froot and Rogoff (1995) put the consensus
estimate of a PPP deviation half life at between 4 to 5 years. More recently, Cheung and Lai (2000) have
shown that the impulse response function of a shock to real exchange rate is hump shaped; they argue
that the half life of a deviation is substantially shorter -- on the order of a year and a half -- if one
measures the beginning of shock decay from the peak of the shock, rather than from the initial impact. If
the traders do not respond to PPP deviations, or respond perversely, then it is no surprise PPP deviations
are slow to decay. 
Another check on these results can be undertaken by correlating these verbal characterizations
with survey-based expectations. Frankel and Froot (1987) estimate the following relationship between
expected depreciation and the gap between spot and long run (S
LR) rates:19 The long-run nominal exchange rate is proxied by relative price levels.
17
using survey measures of expectations.
19 In this case, they obtain estimates for an expected half-life of a
deviation from PPP of about 2.5 years. Given these slow adjustment rates (from the perspective of the
foreign exchange trader), one should not be surprised that the typical trader does not take a particular
action on the basis of a PPP overvaluation. At the daily, or even monthly frequency, reversion to PPP is
likely to be unobservable relative to movements in exchange rates induced by interest rate movements,
for example. In terms of implications for researchers, these results mean that outside observers should
expect to see foreign exchange traders responding to almost every variable but relative price levels. 
5. Discussion
As indicated in the previous sections, the direct responses of market participants provide some
interesting information on several issues in exchange rate economics. It is conceivable that additional
information can be extracted by comparing responses across related questions. To this end we use a
nonparametric test of homogeneity (DeGroot, 1975) to investigate if  the responses to a question are
related to choices selected for another question. In the subsequent discussion, the generic null hypothesis
considered is that there is no dependence between responses to different questions. The nonparametric
procedure is employed as the survey data typically do not satisfy the Normality assumption, which is
commonly imposed in regression analysis. As the survey responses can be sorted and arranged in many
different ways, we present only a selected sample of comparisons below.
First, we examine if the response pattern depends on individual trader’s attributes. The attributes
considered are seniority, trading limit, headquarters location, and turnover volume. For example, when
the seniority attribute is examined, we test if the response pattern is related to whether the respondent is a
treasurer/manager, a chief/senior dealer, or a dealer/junior dealer. In general,  we found no significant
evidence that the responses to the survey depend on any of these four attributes. To conserve space,
detailed results are not reported.
Next, we examine the responses to the question on trading methods. The test statistic for the
hypothesis that the proportions of respondents selecting technical trading rules, customer orders,
fundamental analysis, and jobbing are the same in the five years period is 21.89. Under the null of
homogeneity, the statistic has a chi-square distribution with 3 degrees of freedom. Given the sample
value 21.89, the p-value is 0.00007 and the null hypothesis is strongly rejected. That is, the distribution
of trading methods evolves significantly during the five year period. As the numbers indicated (Figure 5),
the change in trading methods is likely due to a substantial shift from the jobbing approach to the
technical trading method. 
To investigate the possibility that the trading method adopted by traders is related to the nature of
their business (Table 1.b and Figure 5), we test whether the choice of trading methods depends on the
relative share of  interbank and customer business. Before calculating the homogeneity test statistic, the18
four trading methods are grouped into two categories - the fundamental category that includes
fundamental analysis and customer orders and the technical category that includes trading rules and
jobbing. The aggregation  is necessary to ensure that different combinations of responses contain a
reasonable number of observation to construct the test statistics. The test of homogeneity indicates that
the choice of trading methods and the nature of business are closely related. When the responses under
the time stamp “now” are considered, the sample statistic is 10.91 with a p-value 0.001. For the practices
prevailing “five years ago,” the sample statistic is 6.77 with a p-value 0.009. In both cases, we find that
for traders who say customer business accounts for a bigger share of their foreign exchange transactions
tend to assert their trading is based on fundamental analysis or is driven by customer orders.  
An interesting question is whether a trader’s view on effects of speculation depends on his/her
trading method. To shed light on this question, we compare the choices of trading methods and responses
to the two survey questions that are related to speculation. Again the trading methods are grouped into
the fundamental and technical categories as discussed above. First, we cross-check the responses to the
questions on trading methods and on whether excessive speculation is the reason for exchange rates to
differ from their fundamental values (Figure 8.b). The sample statistic turns out to be 0.169 (p-value =
0.681); thus there is no evidence that the opinion on excessive speculation is affected by the trading
method pursued by the trader. Next, we examine the implication of the choice of trading method for
responses to the effect of speculation. For the four effects of speculation listed in Figure 9, the test of
homogeneity statistic has a value from 0.014 (p-value 0.906) to 0.402 (p-value = 0.526). Apparently,
views regarding the effects of speculation are not related to the trading method adopted by individual
traders. In fact, we find no evidence that the choices of trading method significantly influence the views
on the effects of central bank intervention (Figure 10) and the long-run predictive power of PPP (Figure
11.c). Overall, there is very limited evidence on the systematic relationship between traders’ trading
methods and their views about the market.
Do the traders’ views on speculation correlate to those on central bank intervention? With
respect to exchange rate volatility, the traders’ opinions on the effects of speculation and central bank
intervention are independent (statistic = 0.971, p-value = 0.324). However, the respondents who believe
speculation moves the exchange rate away from its fundamental level tend to perceive central bank
intervention as moving the exchange rate toward its fundamental value. This observation is confirmed by
the test statistic for homogeneity, which has a value of 17.284 (p-value = 0.000). Thus, the traders have a
systematically different view on whether speculation and central bank intervention widen or narrow the
deviation from equilibrium. Even though more than one half of the respondents believe speculation and
central bank intervention narrow the gap, a considerable number of respondents view speculation and
central bank intervention as playing different roles in terms of eliminating the disequilibrium exchange
rate.
In Figure 6, it appears that the market takes a longer time to adjust to unexpected news on money
supply and GNP. The test of homogeneity confirms that the adjustment profiles advocated by the traders19
are different across various macro announcements. Specifically, the adjustment profiles of  money supply
and GNP are statistically the same (statistic = 1.51, p-value = 0.22). However, these two profiles are
significantly different from those of the remaining four macro variables. The sample statistic for testing
the hypothesis of the adjustment profile of money supply or GNP is the same as the profile of another
macro variable ranges from 3.28 (p-value = 0.070) to 15.37 (p-value = 0.000). Interestingly, the
adjustment profiles of trade deficits, unemployment rate, inflation, and interest rate are not statistically
different from each other. Thus, there is strong evidence that the traders believe the surprises on money
supply and GNP entail a different exchange rate adjustment path.
Last, but not the least, we compare the trader’s interpretation of PPP and the long-run predictive
power of PPP. To conduct the analysis, we treat the choices of  “academic jargon” and “other” as one
group and the other two as another group (Figure 11a).  Then we test the hypothesis that  the views on
whether PPP predicts exchange rates in the long run and the choices of the meaning of PPP are
independent. The statistic is computed to be 20.552 with a p-value of 0.000. Thus a trader’s view on the
long-run predictive ability depends on his/her perception of PPP. When we examine the actual responses,
we find that respondents selected “academic jargon” or “other” for PPP are more inclined to say PPP has
no predictive power for exchange rates even in the long run. Similar results were obtained for opinions
about the predictive power in the intraday and medium-run horizons.
6. Conclusions
We have examined the responses of interbank foreign exchange traders to questions regarding
the operations of the foreign exchange market at both the microstructural and macroeconomic levels.
With respect to the microstructural characteristics of the market, the share of customer business, versus
interbank business, has remained fairly constant. However, the channels by which these transactions take
place have experienced considerable transformation, as electronically-brokered transactions have become
much more prominent.
We also elicit interesting responses regarding the motivations for certain observable behaviors in
the foreign exchange market. First, the respondents do not view trading profits as the most important
reason for following the market convention; rather the desire to maintain equitable and reciprocal trading
relationships, followed by a desire to maintain a positive market image, are the prominent answers. This
pattern of responses indicates that other motivations not easily captured by standard microstructure
models may explain the adherence to market norms. Second, the most commonly cited reason for
departing from the convention on bid-ask spreads is the onset of a thin/hectic market. This appears to
conform to some recent empirical work linking volatility and wide spreads. However, traders seldom
refer to adverse trading position and asymmetric information as direct reasons for deviating from the
conventional bid-ask spreads. Third, when it comes to the issue of large players the foreign exchange
market is not monolithic. In particular, while the DM/dollar market is widely viewed as fairly
competitive, the smaller dollar-pound and Swiss franc markets are perceived as more dominated by the20
larger banks. Fourth, exchange rate predictability is viewed as fairly low. Surprisingly, there is little
variation in the proportion of traders who hold this view over the various horizons – from intraday to
over six months. However, this final display of relative unanimity stands in stark contrast to the
substantial heterogeneity in forex trader views exhibited on a wide range of subjects.
At the macroeconomic level, short-run exchange rate dynamics are believed to mainly depend on
non-fundamental  forces  (e.g., bandwagon effects, over-reaction  to news, technical trading, and
excessive speculation) rather than fundamentals.  This reinforces the consensus view regarding the
inadequacy of structural exchange rate models based on macroeconomic fundamentals for data at high
frequencies. The respondents also resoundingly affirm that technical trading has non-trivial impact on
short- and medium-run exchange rates. At longer horizons, fundamentals (variously described by the
practitioners themselves) are seen to exert more and more influence. However, we have an only
imprecise knowledge of what these fundamentals are. These results challenge economists to combine
fundamentals and non-fundamentals in a unified model for both short-run and long-run dynamics (De
Long et al., 1990; Frankel and Froot, 1990b; Mark and Wu, 1998; and Osler, 1998). Moreover, a
successful model should also allow for changes in the relative importance of macroeconomic
fundamentals over time and a speedy adjustment to unexpected macroeconomic news.
The traders offer mixed evaluations on speculation and intervention. For instance, both
speculation and central bank intervention are perceived to increase market volatility. However,
practitioners contend  that both speculation and intervention are also likely to restore equilibrium by
moving exchange rates toward their long run values. In this light, volatility is the means by which
deviations are eliminated. On balance, a substantial proportion of  traders assign a positive role to
speculation; they say speculation provides market liquidity and improves market efficiency. While 60%
of respondents agree the timing of intervention is appropriate, there is a split of opinion on whether
intervention achieves its goal or not.  
Finally, in this survey, we confirm the widespread impression that traders themselves do not
view purchasing power parity as a relevant measure of foreign currency values, except perhaps at the
very long horizon. This latter finding offers a market traders’ perspective on the difficulties in detecting
reversion to PPP in the short run and the highly persistent behavior of real exchange rates. At the same
time, it yields some rather troubling implications for international finance more generally, as some form
of PPP is embodied in nearly every modern model of the open economy. 21
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Table 1
FX transaction Types
Now 5 years ago
1.a  Transactions Via
Interbank                  35.72%         48.10%
                (25.00%, 27.38)            (50.00%, 22.00)
Traditional Brokers            17.16%        49.79%
    (15.00%, 13.67)                   (50.00%, 21.14)
Electronic Brokers                                 46.93%                      2.10% 
                                                                 (50.00%, 25.32)                         (0.00%, 4.96)  
1.b  Nature of Business
 Interbank Business                                63.65%                      66.49% 
      (70.00%, 26.85)                     (70.00%, 26.85)
 Customer Business                                       36.34%                                       33.50%
      (30.00%, 25.41)                        (30.00%, 22.86)
 
 NOTE: Figures are arithmetic averages of responses. The median response and standard error of












































Figure 1.d: Average Daily Turnover of the
Organization (in millions of US$)
NOTE: Figure 1.a reports the number of respondents under each of the listed job capacities.
Other figures present the percentages of respondents who select the listed choices. For some
questions, the component frequencies of a category do not sum to one due to rounding. In some
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Figure 2.b: Frequencies of Quotes Different from the Convention
NOTE: The number in the parentheses gives the proportion of respondents indicating the








































Figure 2.e: Reasons for Deviating from the Market
Convention
Key
Reason 1: Thin/Quiet Market 
Reason 2: Thin/Hectic Market
Reason 3: Unexpected Change in Market Activity
Reason 4: Before/After a Major News Release
Reason 5: Increased Market Volatility
Reason 6: A Position against the Market Trend 
Reason 7: Quote for Small Bank
Reason 8: Quote for Informed Trading Bank
Reason 9: Costs of Keeping the Position
Reason 10: Wide-Spread Quote from a Counterparty
NOTE: Figure 2.a reports, for each exchange rate, the mode of  bid-ask  spreads indicated by
respondents. Other figures present  the  percentages of respondents who select the listed choices.
For some  questions, the component frequencies of a category do not sum to one due to rounding.
































Figure 3.b: Competitive Advantage for
Large Players
Key:
Reason 1: Lower Costs 
Reason 2: Better Information 
Reason 3: Large Customer Base 
Reason 4: Deal in Large Volumes  
Reason 5: Ability to Affect Exchange Rates
Reason 6: Smaller Counterparty Risk 
Reason 7: Ability to Offer New FX Products
Reason 8: Accessing the Global Trading Network
Reason 9: Experienced Traders 
Reason 10: Others 
NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported.  For  some questions, the component










































NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported. For some questions, the
component frequencies of a category do not sum to one due to rounding. In some cases, there are
multiple responses or incomplete replies. "Medium-run" refers to periods shorter than six months
while "long-run" refers to periods longer than six months. For the 1-5 scale, 1 indicates no





















Figure 5: Spot Foreign Exchange Trading Method, Five Years Ago versus
Today
NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported. The component frequencies
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Figure 6: Adjustment to the Unexpected Component of Economic Announcements
NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported. For some questions, the
component frequencies of a category do not always sum to one due to rounding. In some cases, there































Figure 7: Effects of Economic Announcements on the Foreign Exchange
Market, Five Years Ago versus Now
NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported. For some questions, the
component frequencies of a category do not always sum to one due to rounding. In some cases, there
are multiple responses or incomplete replies.36
YES NO NO_OPINION
Intraday   Medium Run
(up to 6 months)











Figure 8.a: Do Exchange Rate Movements Reflect Changes in the Fundamental Value?
NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported. For some questions, the
component frequencies of a category do not always sum to one due to rounding. In some cases, there





















Excessive Central Bank Intervention
Figure 8.b: Reasons Exchange Rate Movements Do Not Reflect Changes in the Fundamental Value
NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported. For some questions, the
component frequencies of a category do not always sum to one due to rounding. In some cases, there



































Long Run (over 6 months)
Figure 8.c: Factors Determining Exchange Rate Movements
NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported. For some questions, the component frequencies






Decrease: 18.79% Improve: 73.64% Reduce:
26.35%
Volatility Fundamental Value
Market Liquidity Market Efficiency
Figure 9: Effects of Speculation
NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported. For some questions, the
component frequencies of a category do not sum to one due to rounding. In some cases, there are












Figure 10: Effects of Central Bank Intervention
NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported. For some questions, the
component frequencies of a category do not sum to one due to rounding. In some cases, there are




means the same national
price levels in the same
currency units: 15.95%
Other: 10.14%







        Take no
action: 81.02%
Other: 4.37%
Figure 11.b: Action in Response to a PPP Overvaluation of the US$:
NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported. For some questions, the component frequencies


















Intraday   Medium Run
(up to 6 months)
    Long Run
(over 6 months)
Figure 11.c: Does PPP Predict Exchange Rate Movements?
NOTE: The percentages of respondents in each category are reported. For some questions, the
component frequencies of a category do not always sum to one due to rounding. In some cases, there
are multiple responses or incomplete replies.